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dmarc poc

DMARC aggregate report viewer (proof of concept)

schlittermann.de
EN | DE
clear
records
5
parse errors
1
unique source IPs
1
report date range
2026-06-04 — 2026-10-01 02:00:00

Top 10 source IPs

networkcount
ionos-inf 5

Top 10 header-from domains

domaincount
rabbit.example.com 2
yak.example.com 2
ferret.example.com 1

Phase 1 — Discovery: who is sending mail from your domains? ⓘYou have published p=none and are collecting data. Nobody is being blocked yet.

Focus on message volume, not IP count — a source sending 50 000 messages is urgent; one sending 3 is noise.

Both-fail sources (DKIM fail AND SPF fail) are either spoofing attempts or services that were set up without telling you. Surface these first.

Expand a domain, then open "By source IP" to see the quadrant breakdown per prefix group.

Sender landscape
both pass SPF fail DKIM fail both fail
rabbit.example.com 2
100%
UNKNOWN total 2
IP PTR Total DMARC failures share
212.227.15.15 mout.gmx.net 2
mediaBEAM GmbH total 2

No DMARC failures from this reporter.

source IPheader-fromcount dispositionDKIMSPFreport begin
212.227.15.15 rabbit.example.com 1 none pass fail 2026-09-05 00:00
212.227.15.15 rabbit.example.com 1 none pass fail 2026-09-11 00:00
yak.example.com 2
100%
UNKNOWN total 2
IP PTR Total DMARC failures share
212.227.15.15 mout.gmx.net 2
google.com total 2

No DMARC failures from this reporter.

source IPheader-fromcount dispositionDKIMSPFreport begin
212.227.15.15 yak.example.com 1 none pass fail 2026-10-01 02:00
212.227.15.15 yak.example.com 1 none pass fail 2026-06-15 02:00
ferret.example.com 1
100%
UNKNOWN total 1
IP PTR Total DMARC failures share
212.227.15.15 mout.gmx.net 1
GoDaddy.com total 1

No DMARC failures from this reporter.

source IPheader-fromcount dispositionDKIMSPFreport begin
212.227.15.15 ferret.example.com 1 none pass fail 2026-06-04 02:00

Phase 2 — Hardening: what would break if you tightened the policy? ⓘYou understand your sender landscape and want to move from p=none toward p=quarantine or p=reject. The risk is collateral damage to legitimate mail.

Policy readiness % = share of messages that would survive a reject policy today.

SPF-only sources need DKIM signing added in their sending platform.

DKIM-only sources need their SPF record aligned with your From: domain.

No DMARC alignment sources send all mail failing — configure or block.

Inconsistent sources have mixed results — investigate per-IP.

DMARC readiness
both pass SPF fail DKIM fail both fail
rabbit.example.com 2 / 2
100%
UNKNOWN 2 / 2
IP PTR Fail / Total DMARC failures share
212.227.15.15 mout.gmx.net 2 / 2

DKIM-only — SPF not aligned

mediaBEAM GmbH total 2

No DMARC failures from this reporter.

source IPheader-fromcountdispositionDKIMSPFreport begin
212.227.15.15rabbit.example.com1none pass fail 2026-09-05 00:00
212.227.15.15rabbit.example.com1none pass fail 2026-09-11 00:00
yak.example.com 2 / 2
100%
UNKNOWN 2 / 2
IP PTR Fail / Total DMARC failures share
212.227.15.15 mout.gmx.net 2 / 2

DKIM-only — SPF not aligned

google.com total 2

No DMARC failures from this reporter.

source IPheader-fromcountdispositionDKIMSPFreport begin
212.227.15.15yak.example.com1none pass fail 2026-10-01 02:00
212.227.15.15yak.example.com1none pass fail 2026-06-15 02:00
ferret.example.com 1 / 1
100%
UNKNOWN 1 / 1
IP PTR Fail / Total DMARC failures share
212.227.15.15 mout.gmx.net 1 / 1

DKIM-only — SPF not aligned

GoDaddy.com total 1

No DMARC failures from this reporter.

source IPheader-fromcountdispositionDKIMSPFreport begin
212.227.15.15ferret.example.com1none pass fail 2026-06-04 02:00

Phase 3 — Steady state: did something break? Is anyone spoofing you? ⓘYou have a tight policy in place (p=quarantine or p=reject). Watch for anomalies.

New sources — an IP appearing for the first time in the last 30 days that was not seen before. Could be a new legitimate sender nobody configured, or the start of a spoofing campaign.

Active failures — sources still failing DMARC under a strict policy in the last 30 days. Persistent failures with high volume are either spoofing or a misconfigured legitimate service that needs fixing.

If a major reporter (Google, Microsoft) stops appearing, your rua= address may be bouncing.

Alignment health — last 30 days
both pass SPF fail DKIM fail both fail
06-04
06-15
09-04
09-10
10-01
rabbit.example.com 2 / 2
100%
06-04
06-15
09-04
09-10
10-01
UNKNOWN new 2 / 2
IP PTR Fail / Total DMARC failures share
212.227.15.15 mout.gmx.net 0 / 2
mediaBEAM GmbH total 2

No DMARC failures from this reporter.

source IPheader-fromcountdispositionDKIMSPFreport begin
212.227.15.15rabbit.example.com1none pass fail 2026-09-05 00:00
212.227.15.15rabbit.example.com1none pass fail 2026-09-11 00:00
yak.example.com 2 / 2
100%
06-04
06-15
09-04
09-10
10-01
UNKNOWN new 2 / 2
IP PTR Fail / Total DMARC failures share
212.227.15.15 mout.gmx.net 0 / 2
google.com total 2

No DMARC failures from this reporter.

source IPheader-fromcountdispositionDKIMSPFreport begin
212.227.15.15yak.example.com1none pass fail 2026-10-01 02:00
212.227.15.15yak.example.com1none pass fail 2026-06-15 02:00
ferret.example.com 1 / 1
100%
06-04
06-15
09-04
09-10
10-01
UNKNOWN new 1 / 1
IP PTR Fail / Total DMARC failures share
212.227.15.15 mout.gmx.net 0 / 1
GoDaddy.com total 1

No DMARC failures from this reporter.

source IPheader-fromcountdispositionDKIMSPFreport begin
212.227.15.15ferret.example.com1none pass fail 2026-06-04 02:00